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Abstract
This paper reports security problems with improper implementations of an im-
proved version of FEA-M (fast encryption algorithm for multimedia). It is found
that an implementation-dependent differential chosen-plaintext attack or its chosen-
ciphertext counterpart can reveal the secret key of the cryptosystem, if the involved
(pseudo-)random process can be tampered (for example, through a public time
service). The implementation-dependent differential attack is very efficient in com-
plexity and needs only O(n2) chosen plaintext or ciphertext bits. In addition, this
paper also points out a minor security problem with the selection of the session
key. In real implementations of the cryptosystem, these security problems should
be carefully avoided, or the cryptosystem has to be further enhanced to work under
such weak implementations.
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1 Introduction
Multimedia data play important roles in today’s digital world. In many mul-
timedia applications, such as pay-TV services, commercial video conferences
and medical imaging systems, fast and secure encryption methods are required
to protect the multimedia contents against malicious attackers. In recent years,
many different multimedia encryption schemes have been proposed to fulfill
such an increasing demand (Uhl and Pommer, 2005; Furht et al., 2004; Li
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et al., 2004). In (Yi et al., 2001), a new fast encryption algorithm for multi-
media (FEA-M) was proposed, which bases the security on the complexity of
solving nonlinear Boolean equations. Later FEA-M was employed to construct
a key agreement protocol by the same authors in (Yi et al., 2002). Since then,
some attacks of FEA-M have been reported (Mihaljevic´ and Kohno, 2002; Mi-
haljevic´, 2003; Wu et al., 2003; Youssef and Tavares, 2003), most of which can
break the key with a smaller complexity than the simple brute force attack
(Mihaljevic´ and Kohno, 2002; Mihaljevic´, 2003; Wu et al., 2003), and one of
which can completely break the whole cryptosystem with only one known and
two chosen plaintext blocks (Youssef and Tavares, 2003).
To enhance the security and to avoid some other defects, an improved ver-
sion of FEA-M was proposed in (Mihaljevic´, 2003). This paper reports some
security problems with improper implementations of the cryptosystem. We
point out that the secret key of the cryptosystem can be revealed by an
implementation-dependent differential attack if the involved (pseudo-)random
process can be tampered. One of such situations is when the pseudo-random
process is uniquely controlled by an external source (such as a public time
service), though it appears that such an implementation would not compro-
mise the security of the cryptosystem itself. The proposed differential attack
is very efficient, since only two pairs of chosen plaintext blocks are needed
to completely reveal the key. As a result, in a real implementation of the
cryptosystem, it should be ensured that the embedded pseudo-random pro-
cess cannot be controlled by illegal users. Or, the improved FEA-M has to be
further enhanced to resist this implementation-dependent attack. In addition,
a minor problem with the selection of the session key is also discussed in this
paper.
2 Improved FEA-M
The original FEA-M (Yi et al., 2001) is a block cipher with both plaintext and
ciphertext feedback. It encrypts the plaintext in the form of n × n Boolean
matrices, by an n × n Boolean key matrix. The elements of the matrices are
either 0 or 1 and all matrix operations are made over GF (2), i.e., modulo 2.
As a result, the ciphertext is also in the form of n× n Boolean matrices.
Previous works have shown that the original FEA-M has the following defects:
1) the key can be easily broken by an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack pro-
posed in (Youssef and Tavares, 2003); 2) an efficient known-plaintext attack
can break it with a complexity smaller than the brute force attack (Mihaljevic´
and Kohno, 2002; Mihaljevic´, 2003; Wu et al., 2003); 3) it is sensitive to packet
loss (Mihaljevic´, 2003) and channel errors due to the use of plaintext feedback.
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To overcome the above-mentioned security defects, Mihaljevic´ proposed an
improved FEA-M in 2003. The improved scheme contains two stages: key
distribution and working stage. The first stage generates two n × n secret
Boolean matrices, a session key K and an initial matrix V , generally from a
master key K0, which is also an n × n Boolean matrix and known by both
the sender and the receiver. The key distribution protocol is actually the one
used in (Yi et al., 2002) and can be described as follows.
• The sender selects K and V via a (pseudo-)random process, and computes
K∗=K0K−1K0, (1)
V ∗=K0V K0, (2)
then sends (K∗,V ∗) to the receiver.
• The receiver recovers K−1 and V by computing
K−1=K−10 K
∗K−10 , (3)
V =K−10 V
∗K−10 . (4)
After the key distribution stage, the sender and the receiver sides can start
the encryption/decryption procedure with the session key K and the initial
matrix V . Denoting the i-th n × n plain-matrix by Pi and the i-th n × n
cipher-matrix by Ci, the encryption procedure is as follows:
Ci=K
(
Pi +KVK
i
)
Kn+i +KVKi, (5)
and the decryption procedure is
Pi=K
−1 (Ci +KVKi)K−(n+i) +KVKi. (6)
The above procedure repeats for each plain/cipher-matrix until the plain-
text/ciphertext exhausts.
3 Implementation-Dependent Differential Attack
In this section, we describe an implementation-dependent differential attack
of the improved FEA-M. This attack works under the conditions that one can
tamper the involved (pseudo-)random process of the improved FEA-M to use
the same K and V in two separate encryption sessions.
Given two plain-matrices, P
(1)
i and P
(2)
i , and their corresponding cipher-
matrices, C
(1)
i and C
(2)
i , we can get Eq. (7).
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(
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(
P
(1)
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(
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(2)
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=K
(
P
(1)
i + P
(2)
i
)
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Apparently, Eq. (7) means a simple relation between ∆Ci = C
(1)
i + C
(2)
i =
C
(1)
i −C(2)i and ∆Pi = P (1)i + P (2)i = P (1)i − P (2)i , i.e., the plaintext and the
ciphertext differentials (sums):
∆Ci=K (∆Pi)K
n+i. (8)
As a result, for two consecutive plaintext-matrices, if we choose ∆Pi+1 = ∆Pi,
we can immediately deduce:
∆Ci+1=K (∆Pi+1)K
n+i+1
=K (∆Pi)K
n+i ·K
=∆CiK. (9)
Thus, if ∆Ci is invertible, the session key can be derived easily as follows:
K =(∆Ci)
−1∆Ci+1. (10)
To make ∆Ci invertible, one should choose ∆Pi to be an invertible matrix
over GF (2), where note that K is always invertible following the design of
the cryptosystem.
After K is broken, one can substitute it into Eq. (5) to get a linear equation
with n2 unknown variables, i.e., the n2 elements of the initial matrix V :
V Kn+i +K−1V =K−2
(
Ci −KPiKn+i
)
K−i. (11)
By solving this linear equation, it is easy to recover V . Actually, we can further
reduce the linear equation to directly deduce V . Choosing two continuous
plaintext matrices Pi, Pj and adding the two linear systems, one has
V Kn+i
(
I +Kj−i
)
=K−2
(
Ci −KPiKn+i
)
K−i
+K−2
(
Cj −KPjKn+j
)
K−j. (12)
When I +Kj−i is invertible, V can be immediately solved by multiplying
the right side by (I +Kj−i)−1K−(n+i) at the end. Note that Kn+i +Kn+j
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may never be invertible over GF (2) (for example, when K = I), though the
probability is relatively small when n is relatively high. Once such an event
occurs, one can turn to solve Eq. (11). If V can still not be solved from Eq.
(11), one has to carry out the attack with some other different values of K
until V can be uniquely solved.
Once K and V are both known, one can use the method proposed in Sec. III
of (Youssef and Tavares, 2003) to recover the master key K0.
To carry out a successful attack, in most cases, the attacker only needs to
choose two plaintexts with four chosen plaintext matrices, P
(1)
i , P
(1)
i+1, P
(2)
i and
P
(2)
i+1, which satisfy P
(1)
i+1 −P (2)i+1 = P (1)i −P (2)i = ∆P and ∆P is an invertible
matrix. Considering each matrix is a n×n Boolean matrix, 4n2 chosen plain-
bits are required in total. When n = 64, as suggested in (Yi et al., 2001, 2002),
only 2048 plain-bytes are needed. In addition, the complexity of the proposed
attack is very small, actually it is of the same order as the one proposed in
(Youssef and Tavares, 2003). In the case that V can not be solved with four
chosen plaintext matrices, more plaintext matrices have to be chosen, but the
number of chosen plaintext bits is still of the same order – O(n2).
Next, let us see in which improper implementations an attacker can manage to
tamper the involved (pseudo-)random process to activate the above differential
attack. Apparently, the above attack requires two encryption sessions with the
same session keyK and the same initial matrix V , one for encrypting the first
plaintext
{
· · · ,P (1)i ,P (1)i+1
}
and the other for encrypting the second plaintext{
· · · ,P (2)i ,P (2)i+1
}
. However, in each encryption session, K and V have to be
reset at the sender side via a (pseudo-)random process and distributed to
the receiver side via the key distribution protocol. As a result, generally two
different sessions use differentK and V . However, in real world the encryption
scheme may be improperly implemented such that the attacker can tamper the
(pseudo-)random process. As a typical example, let us assume that the process
is uniquely determined by the system clock 1 . In chosen-plaintext attacks,
the attacker has a temporary access to the encryption machine, so he can
intentionally alter the system clock to control the (pseudo-)random process
before running each session to get the sameK and V for two separate sessions.
In addition, if the improved FEA-M is implemented in such an insecure way
that the second stage can restart without running the key distribution stage,
the attack becomes straightforward.
1 In (Yi et al., 2001, 2002; Mihaljevic´, 2003), it is not mentioned how to realize the
random process. One of the simplest (though maybe less frequently-used) method
to realize a pseudo-random process is to initialize the seed of the pseudo-random
number generator using the current time stamp. A list of some other more compli-
cated ways can be found in Section “The Collection of Data Used to Create a Seed
for Random Number” of (Microsoft Corporation, 2005).
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At last, it deserves mentioned that the above differential chosen-plaintext at-
tack can be easily to generalize to a differential chosen-ciphertext attack, pro-
vided that the (pseudo-)random process at the decryption machine can be
tampered. Rewrite Eq. (8) into the following form:
∆Pi=K
−1 (∆Ci)K−(n+i). (13)
Then, by choosing ∆Ci+1 = ∆Ci, one has
∆Pi+1=K
−1 (∆Ci+1)K−(n+i+1)
=K−1 (∆Ci)K−(n+i)−1
=∆PiK
−1. (14)
Other steps are identical with the above differential chosen-plaintext attack.
4 A Minor Problem with Selection of Session Key
It is noticed that K cannot be selected at random from all invertible ma-
trices over GF (2). Since all n × n invertible matrices form a general linear
group GL(n, 2), whose order is O =
∏n−1
i=0 (2
n − 2i) (Wikipedia, 2005). So,
denoting the order of K over GL(n, 2) by o(K), it is true that o(K) | O,
i.e., Ko(K) = I, where I is the identity Boolean matrix (Gilbert and Gilbert,
2005). It is obvious that o(K) actually corresponds to the periodicity of the
encryption/decryption function with respect to the plaintext/ciphertext index
i. Generally speaking, the periodicity should not be too small to maintain an
acceptable security level. As an extreme example, when K = I, o(K) = 1
and the encryption procedure becomes Ci = Pi (the cipher vanishes). Thus,
K should be selected randomly from all invertible Boolean matrices with suf-
ficiently large orders, which means a significant reduction of the session key
space.
5 Conclusions
This paper reports an implementation-dependent differential attack of an im-
proved fast encryption algorithm for multimedia (FEA-M) proposed in (Mihal-
jevic´, 2003). The attack works under the condition where the involved (pseudo-
)random process can be tampered by the attacker. In this case, the attack can
reveal the key with four or more chosen plaintext/ciphertext matrices, i.e.,
4n2 chosen plain/ciphertext bits, in two or more separate encryption sessions.
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The result shows that a secure cryptosystem may become totally insecure with
seemingly-harmless implementation details in real world (Schneier, 2000). In
addition, a minor problem with the selection of the session key is also discussed
in this paper.
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